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ANNEX A To
1 ATF FRAG No 7 To
CPO No 19/68
Dated 22 May 68

ENEMY SITUATION AO's SURFERS/NEWPORT

As At 211200H May 68

Reference: A. Annex A to Frag No 6 to CPO 19/68 dated 10 May 68.

General.

1. In addition to the main points made in the above reference, the following information is provided.
2. A trace of main enemy base camps already located by US/ARVN forces in AO NEWPORT has been issued separately to 1RAR and 3RAR.
3. PW reports placed 165 NVA Regt as follows on 3 May 68:
 - a. 4th Bn - XT919351
 - b. 5th Bn - XT938357
 - c. 6th Bn - XT958368
 - d. RHQ - XT943369

These reports were generally substantiated on 17/18 May by VR sightings of fresh diggings, bunkers and trail activity in these areas.

4. It is suspected that HQ 7 NVA Division or some other major HQ is located in vicinity XT9534 - 9634. Tunnel entrances, freshly dug bunkers, reports of sighting green communication cables and activity of enemy AAHMG fire in and near this general area, all tend to indicate the location of an important enemy HQ or base area in this general vicinity.
5. Agent reports dated 17/18 May 68, which cannot yet be evaluated, indicate that elements of both the DONG NAI Regt and the independent PHU LOI II Bn are located to the East and North East of AO BONDI.

Enemy Identification.

6. It can now be assumed from contacts, PW reports and captured documents, that elements of the following enemy main force units are located in or near AO SURFERS/AO NEWPORT:
 - a. HQ 7 NVA Div
 - b. 141 NVA Regt
 - c. 165 NVA Regt
 - d. 275 NVA Infiltration Gp
 - e. 269 NVA Infiltration Gp
 - f. DONG NAI Regt (NVA/VC)
 - g. PHU LOI II Indep Bn (NVA)
 - h. 81 and 83 Rear Services Gps
 - i. Elements of 69 VC Artillery Command.

Enemy Weapons.

7. Enemy forces have already launched two heavy attacks, utilizing very considerable medium mortar and RPG fire, supplemented by heavy AW and AAHMG fire. It can be anticipated that as soon as enemy forces have re-grouped and to some extent, redeployed, that further heavy attacks, both by fire and by ground assault, will be undertaken against PSPB CORAL or forward elements.

Enemy Tactics.

8. Indications to date show the following significant trends in enemy tactics:
 - a. Moving close-up to objectives some two or three hours before attacking.
 - b. Heavy and accurate mortar and RPG fire.

- e. Infantry assault pushed home with determination.
- d. Positioning of AAHMM's within or extremely close to our FEBA in order to minimize return fire from LFT's.
- e. Willingness to continue his attacks after first light.
- f. Rapid dispersal and concealment immediately after breaking contact.
- g. Determination to undertake very close-in daylight reconnaissance despite our constant air observation.

9. It must be remembered that we are operating into a major, and very extensive enemy base area, which possesses an extremely complex group of bunkers, trenches, camps and food and arms caches. These are located underground with good overhead cover from both air and artillery strikes. It is not expected that extensive minefields will be encountered. Scattered mines may be found along or adjacent to Routes 16, 1A or the more important trails.

Conclusion:

10. There are numerous enemy troops in the area, representing elements of at least three infantry regiments, plus Divisional and Rear Service units, and a strong artillery component. They are fighting in their home base areas, with very extensive and immediate logistic support available to them.

11. It should be anticipated that the enemy will adopt extremely aggressive tactics in attempting to deny us entry into his home areas. Any further attack against FSPB CORAL can be expected to utilize stronger forces or heavier firepower than previously employed.

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1 ATF (FWD)

ENEMY SITUATION AC SURFERS II

AS AT 291200 MAY 68

Reference: A, Annex A to 1 ATF FRAC No 7 to CPO No 19/68 dated 22 May 68.

General

1. Enemy action in the last few days culminated in attacks by fire and ground assaults against FSPB BALMORAL and attacks by fire against FSPB CORAL during night 27/28 May 68.

Infiltration Groups

2. Interrogation of the latest six PW taken by 3 RAR after the action at BALMORAL has provided valuable information on enemy infiltration groups which are entering our area of influence.

3. The infiltration groups so far identified by 1 ATF are as follows:

		<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>ARRIVAL FROM NVN</u>
a.	269	?	?
b.	275	?	?
c.	745	?	Dec 67
d.	NAM HA	500	13 May 68
e.	233	100	25 May 68
f.	D280	400	26 May 68
g.	165	500	17 May 68

4. These groups, (representing a troop strength in excess of 1500 men), provide a ready reserve from which HQ 7 NVA Div is drawing its infantry to flesh out units of both 165 and 141 NVA Regts. Elements of 269 and 275 Infiltration Groups took part in attacks against FSPB CORAL on 12/13 and 15/16 May in conjunction with, or as part of K2, K3 Bns, C17 RR Coy and C18 AA Coy of 141 NVA Regt.

5. Elements of the remaining groups took part in attacks against FSPB BALMORAL on 27/28 May as part of K2, K3 and possibly K5 Bns 165 NVA Regt.

6. It appears that 165 NVA Regt is operating in the North of AO NEWPORT and 141 NVA Regt is deployed in the East of AO BONDI. Any new attack will probably be mounted by 141 Regt against FSPB CORAL itself or 1 ATF elements operating out from CORAL. Radio Hanoi and local Communist propaganda material claims a great victory by 141 Regt against Australian forces on 13 May 68.

7. A PW from 165 Regt claimed that his Regt had been ordered to "emulate the victory achieved by 141 Regt" and had been committed against FSPB BALMORAL for this reason. It is now 14 days since 141 Regt's infantry elements have been in action and HQ 7 Div may decide to use them again, in order to allow 165 Regt more time to recover from its recent losses.

8. Current overall enemy losses to 291200H May 68 are 205 KIA (3C), 6 PW, 1 Chieu Hoi, 33 crew-served and 90 individual weapons.

Assessment of Probable Enemy Intentions

9. During the next few days the enemy will continue to re-group, resupply and reconstitute his forces. He will attempt to increase attacks by fire, both in order to harass our forces and to cover the movement of supplies and personnel. In addition he will use these attacks to demonstrate his continued presence and influence in this area.

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